Reading Between the Lines: Estimating Tiger Tank Production



By Matt Dedrick


This is the first of a series of articles intended to explore the effects on Tiger 1 production caused by the Royal Air Forces’s area fire-bombing of the medieval City of Kassel on the night of October 22,23, 1943. Though the bombing of Kassel was regarded by Henschel management and the Heereswaffenamt to have been the singular event most affecting Tiger 1 production, it has been virtually ignored in the available literature As a result, the production of Tiger 1 tanks during the four months following the bombing of Kassel has been poorly understood by modellers and tank historians alike.

Most of the data and documents on Tiger 1 production was lost during the war. Much of what is available has been researched, interpreted and published in the many books compiled by those two remarkable research-historians, the late Mr. Tom Jentz and the late Mr. Walter Spielberger The data found in their books has been largely based on Henschel monthly production statistics, wartime documents, minutes from the Heereswaffenamt /Henschel meetings, post war interviews, photographs as well as the data found in the various army manuals, journals and publications.

Specific data was not always available. In order to form a picture of Tiger 1 production, it was necessary to use the available data much of which was extracted from Mr. Jentz’s various books. Post war inspections of Henschel and Wegmann and interviews of personnel, by Allied intelligence teams such as recorded in the United States Strategic Bombing Survey Reports,  were useful, but since Tiger 1 production had ended in August 1944, the data mostly pertained to production of the Tiger II tank. I gathered all the basic information and data, then attempted to expand upon the data, by ‘reading between the lines’ to establish basic production parameters upon which the effects of the Kassel bombing could be estimated.

The assistance of the late Mr. Tom Jentz and Mr. Bill Auerbach  in reviewing the initial draft copy of my paper was greatly appreciated. I am particularly indebted to Mr. Peter Mueller of “History Facts’ publications for his assistance and providing many of the documents I needed. His many telephone calls to explain those documents was very important.. The photographs in these articles are scanned from the various books including the “Tiger 1 in combat” series by Col. Wolfgang Schneider and are used with his permission.

What I have written will never see publication as it is essentially a theory on a murky part of Tiger 1 tank production, I have sent portions of my study to various persons recognized as having an interest in Tiger tanks, in England, Germany, France, Canada and the U.S.A., asking to share information,. Unfortunately, there has been little to no response or assistance.. My research needs input from other persons having a serious knowledge of German tank production, who have data to prove, disprove or expand upon what I have written…If anything, that is the intent of this series.




In November, 2011, after reviewing the draft copy of my paper on the effects of the Royal Air Force’s October 22/23, 1943 fire bombing of the City of Kassel on Tiger 1 tank production, the late Mr.Tom Jentz, despite his illness, forwarded his comments and suggestions. The following are some of his comments                 :

  • “It was war time. The idea was to get tanks out the factory door as quick as possible”
  • “Henschel didn’t care what a Tiger tank looked like. They didn’t care what mods they had. All they cared about was getting an assembled tank passed by the inspectors and getting paid for it”.
  • “The assembly workers would assemble a vehicle with whatever was on hand and whatever was most easily accessible. The workers didn’t care if they put on regular wheels or steel wheels. It was all the same to them and no one was checking off what mods were going on”.

Though this is not exactly what many tank enthusiasts would like to believe, Mr. Jentz’s comments do accurately reflect the reality of war time Tiger tank production, at both the Wegmann turret assembly and the Henschel tank assembly plants during the late 1943-1944 production periods.

Overall, the data assembled by Mr. Jentz in his books on the Tiger tank is very accurate, but his modification data has been interpreted far too literally by some modellers — without taking into consideration the origin and limitations that existed within the data he uncovered and documented during his research into Tiger tank production.

The main sources for the chassis numbers documenting the modifications to the Tiger 1 tank, as recorded by the late Mr. Jentz, were taken from the D-Vorschriften (operational and maintenance manuals), the AHM or general army bulletin, and  the Heeres Techniches Verordnungs Blatt or ‘Army technical orders bulletin’, abbreviated  ‘H.T.V.Bl’.( Panzer Tracts No.23,”Panzer Production” p 23.3 ).

Monthly Tiger tank production had more than tripled between February, 1943 and February, 1944. Other tanks, such as the Panther Ausf D, the Bergepanther and the first Tiger II tanks were also being assembled, albeit in small numbers on the same assembly line at the same time  during January 1944. The effects of this change, coupled with major production problems, had a profound effect on Tiger 1 tank production, in articular, between late December 1943 and early February 1944

Mr. Jentz recognized this fact as can be seen in his comments on the modifications he documented in his books on the Tiger 1 and Tiger II tanks.

 In Section 3.4 of his book “D.W. to Tiger 1” ( page 71) he noted:

  • The modifications are listed “as they first appear on the completed Tiger 1 leaving the assembly plant”

He then described an exception*. ”In rare cases several months elapsed between the appearance of a modification and the time it was present on all newly produced Tiger 1 leaving the assembly plant.”

*Note: I  refer to this portion of Section 3.4 as Section 3.4(a) since it is in effect, an amendment to the statement as given in Section 3.4.

Mr. Jentz added the following information in his other books.:

  • ” In some cases it took several months* to have a new modification incorporated on all new production Tigers, mainly due to “first in, last out” tendencies. This resulted from stockpiles of older parts being covered or buried by deliveries of newer parts which were therefore used first”.( Osprey publication “Tiger 1, Heavy Tanks 1942-1945” p12 )

*Note: The several months” referred to in the above statement, is partly a reference to the three month contingency inventory system in extant at all German  tank assembly plants during WWII )

  • A similar observation is noted in the book”VK45.02 to Tiger II, (p.64) in which he adds,” The newer parts being easier to obtain were used first until their removal allowed access to the older parts.”

Section 3.4(a).itself, is seemingly innocuous, so it’s significance is often overlooked by modellers….. but what do Sections 3.4 and the amendment 3.4(a) really mean?

It can be seen that Mr. Jentz in his Section 3.4(a) is describing two separate appearances of the same modification during two separate periods of production.

  • The first appearance of the modified component occurred prior to it’s scheduled introduction, due to a ‘first in, last out’ warehousing problem. Once the supplies of the older component were again accessible, the assembly of the older component resumed on the tank assembly lines.
  • ‘Several months’ later, when the inventories of the older component were totally depleted, only the new modified component remained in the Henschel inventory. The new component now appeared on all tanks “leaving the assembly plant” and as a result, was now listed and illustrated in the manuals or other publications, as a reference statistic for tank repair shops, spare parts depots, tank repair companies etc.

Since it appears only one record for the introduction of a modification was recorded in the manuals and publications, the earlier ‘first appearance’ of the modification could not have been recorded in the manuals  Obviously, it was only when that modification first appeared on all tanks in full production, that it was  recorded, described and illustrated in the manuals.

The fact that a modification was listed and described in a manual as being introduced into production during a specific month, does not preclude the possibility that an earlier unrecorded appearance of that same modification may also have occurred on the assembly lines days, weeks or even months prior, on just a few tanks ‘leaving the assembly plant’. It also appears this was not an uncommon event on the war time tank assembly lines, where there was a tendency to regularly ‘blend in’ new modifications, This ‘blending in’ occurred both at the Tiger hull / turret welding assembly shops at the steel rolling mills, as well as at the Wegmann turret assembly plant and on the two assembly lines at the Henschel tank assembly plant.


Blending in” at the steel rolling mills welding assembly shops:

There was often a backlog of older hull and turret parts in the steel rolling mills welding assembly shops, which when assembled with a newly modified part, created a few hulls or turrets having a ‘blend’ of old and new parts.  For example:

  • Starting in about May 1943, the Krupp steel rolling mills modified the steel sheets being rolled and cut for the turret roofs by cutting the openings to fit the new periscope equipped commander’s cupola,(Prismenspiegelkuppel) A new left side turret plate was also cut out with an opening for the new Krupp designed MP port plug (MP-Stopfen).. The plug replaced the earlier MP-pistol port or ‘MP Klappe”.  (Jentz, DW to Tiger 1 p.80)
  • However, it appears there still existed a small backlog of turret sides cut out for the old MP-Klappe in the rolling mill’s Tiger welding assembly shop. As a result, some modified turrets roofs cut out for the new commander’s cupola, were welded together using the backlogs of older turret sides, still having the cut out for the older MP-Klappe.
  • These interim turrets having the new commanders cupola but retaining the old MP-Klappe were assembled at the Wegmann turret assembly plant in July 1943 As can be seen in photographs, some tanks completed in that period were assembled with ‘mis-matched’ turrets having the new commander’s cupola but still having the older MP-Klappe,,

A similar ‘blending in’ of old and new parts at the steel rolling mills can be seen in a photograph of a Tiger 1 tank, using an ‘interim’ hull– which had been welded together at the rolling mills in late September, 1943. The hull was assembled using the very last side plate from a backlog of older hull side plates, welded together with a new, modified hull side plate, having the lengthened and cut away hull extensions. This ‘mismatched’ hull was assembled at the Henschel plant in late January 1944, using the new, modified turret and steel rim road wheels. The tank crews from the sPzAbt502 seen in the photograph, standing alongside the tank, probably didn’t care that it had mis-matched hull extensions.. It was a fully functional Tiger tank and the tank crew were undoubtedly quite happy to have a new Tiger tank. Nothing went to waste, it was war time tank production.(1)

Blending-in at the Assembly Plants

Similar ‘blending in’ processes undoubtedly occurred during the introduction of new modified components both at Wegmann and on the two assembly lines at the Henschel plant.  At Henschel, uneven rates of production existed between the two machining lines at Takt 2 to Takt stations. One machining line required hulls to be moved by an overhead crane between the machining stations, while on the other, newer, machining line, the hulls were moved on wheels between the machining stations. This would have resulted in an uneven rate of production between the two machining lines, which would have continued into the Takt 5  to Takt 8 tank assembly stations. (Jentz: VK45.02 to Tiger II, p.60)

  • The older and slower machining / assembly line appears to have been allocated to include ‘special tank’ production. The Panther Ausf D, the Bergepanther, and the early production of the Tiger II tank, appear to have been assembled in ‘batch lots’ in a series, on this one assembly line. In between assembling these special production tanks, this assembly line would have continued with the machining and assembly of Tiger 1 command and battle tanks. (The assembly of Tiger 1 command tanks was more costly and labour intensive and as a result was most likely assigned to a specialized production line).(2)
  • In order to achieve the monthly production goals, the newer and faster machining line was undoubtedly allocated solely to the production of Tiger 1 battle tanks.

New modified components were introduced on each assembly line, as existing inventories of older components on the assembly lines were depleted. Stores of these new components were brought to the individual Takt stations specified in the Henschel foremen’s supply requisitions. Since the older, slower line may have been assembling other tanks. it was probably still assembling Tiger tanks using it’s supply of the older components– while the newer assembly line was already installing the new modified components on the Tiger tank hulls at it’s work stations. It was war time tank production.

For anyone attempting to date a specific Tiger 1 tank solely on a photograph taken in a specific time period during 1943-44, the interpretation of the published modification data prior to December 1943 will generally be accurate,

However, in late October 1943, a major disruption to the Tiger tank assembly schedules occurred, during the three months following the Royal Air Force’s fire bombing of the old City of Kassel.  During late December 1943, a change in production schedules led to a mix of modifications appearing on two different tank hulls and two different turrets, which were being assembled and completed during late December–early January 1944.  It was the result of a production event similar to a ‘first in, last out’ scenario, but on a larger scale.

New, modified components were assembled on tanks using both the older and the new, modified hulls and turrets, during late December 1943. These modifications appeared about four weeks ahead of their recorded appearance (ie..on ‘all tanks leaving the assembly plant”) As a result, the use of the published modification data to make conclusions about any of those Tiger 1 tanks assembled in late December through mid January 1944, will generally be inaccurate– unless one allows for the  possibility that the modifications had already appeared weeks earlier than listed in the published data…….

For example, beginning in late December 1943, a mix of both old and new modifications had appeared on some Tiger 1 command and battle tanks completed over a two week period..  Modifications, such as the ‘Fuchs Device’ (Heiszwassergeraet), the 600 mm idler wheels, the revised (bolted) guide for the engine hand crank, the 20 ton jack, the close-in defense (CID) weapon (Nahvertidigungswaffe), and the modified turret escape hatch hinge, had appeared on some Tiger 1 tanks completed in late December 1943 and early January, 1944..

Strange as it may seem, the chassis number of the first tank having the modification and a description of the modification, were only published in the various wartime manuals, journals or bulletins. when each modification had “appeared on all tanks leaving the assembly plant” and had thereby met the criteria being used for publication, The modifications first seen on tanks assembled in late December 1943 had later appeared in full production at varying times between mid January and early February 1944 –or even later in the case of the CID weapon,(4))  After all, it was war-time tank production.

The effects of the bombing of Kassel on the various aspects of Tiger 1 production during the late December 1943 through to the early February 1944 production periods, will be covered in subsequent parts of this series. Though some of what I have written may seem controversial to those not familiar with German tank production, it is based on what I have been able to glean and garner from the available literature, from copies of original documents and from published statistics….by ‘reading between the lines



If a historian or modeller is attempting to date an unusual Tiger tank, based solely on a single visible modification in a photograph, the most important part of Section 3.4 and 3.4(a) to remember, is the fact that the chassis number of any ‘first tank’ prematurely assembled with new or modified parts, was not recorded in the manuals, journals etc

The listing of a modification occurred only when that modification had achieved full production status and was consistantly appearing on “all tanks leaving the assembly plant” To have done otherwise could only have resulted in utter confusion. After all, it was wartime tank production.

Mr. Jentz is missed very much….he could have told us so much more about German tank production, than what he was able to leave behind for us in his many books


 1) The opening in the turret roof for the new periscope equipped commander’s cupola was cut away at the rolling mills. It was designed to fit only the new commander’s cupola. As a result, the older commander’s cupola was not interchangeable with the new cupola. (D. Byrden, Pers. Corresp. 2011) Though some crude field conversions may have occurred, Tiger 1 tanks assembled with turrets having both the new cupola and the older MP-Klappe, were assembled at the welding assembly plant and were not a later conversion of an older turret with a new cupola.

2) Though there is no definitive data to indicate that only the older assembly line was being allocated for mixed production. Consider the following:

  • The hulls for the various tanks differed in size and profile. Holes for the torsion bars and drive/idler wheels on the hull sides of Panthers and Tiger II hulls were spaced differently than on the Tiger 1. The turret lathe and the boring machines in particular, needed to be changed to accommodate the different hulls. These changes required additional set-up times which, along with differences in the assembly process would have interrupted regular Tiger 1 production.
  • In a letter to the HWA on September 15, 1943, Henschel complained about the lack of consistent deliveries of Panther hulls, noting it had not received“ a single Panther hull” between September 9 and September 15. As a result Henschel claimed it’s “drilling assembly line had not been in operation for days”                         (Spielberger , Panther etc. p.97  ) Obviously only part of the one machining line would have been allowed to remain affected by the delay for six days. However, from what Henschel stated it can be concluded that the machining and assembly of Panther hulls was being carried out on only one machining/ assembly line.
  • Henschel was a business and increased their profits from Tiger tank production by keeping costs down. The machining and assembling of Panther tanks, Bergepanther and the early production of the Tiger II would have been carried out in ‘batch lots’ (ie. in a series) to reduce set-up times and labour costs..

From a company viewpoint, since they were being paid by the army for a completed and accepted tank, the need to achieve or exceed the monthly production goals for the Tiger 1 tank was paramount. Henschel management would not have interrupted the production of the Tiger 1 on their most productive assembly line by ‘scheduling-in’ the machining and assembly of a few Panther or Tiger II tanks. (the ‘blending-in’ of the Tiger II into production on the newer machining / assembly line was undoubtedly done later, near the end of Tiger 1 production)

3) According to Michael Winniger in the book “OKH Toy Factory, The Nibelungenwerk etc”.( p.245) “ Each completed chassis was given a specific number from the contingent of chassis numbers allotted by the Army Ordnance Office.”. Since he specifies “completed tanks’ he indicates the chassis numbers were assigned to the completed Panther tanks at the end of production, probably just prior to army acceptance.. This differs completely from the assignment of chassis numbers at Henschel,.which appear to have been assigned to the hulls at the start of the assembly process .

The Wa I, Rue.(WuG) In-6 (Waffen Industrielle Ruestung.(Waffen und Geraet) Inspektorat-6) controlled the supply of spare parts stores held at the ordnance depots (HZA), so it seems probable one of it’s offices also controlled the army purchased inventory of raw materials held at the two assembly plants.( Spielberger. “Panzers 35 (t) and 38 etc”. p.370  ) The army purchased inventories (hulls, engines etc) stored at the Henschel plant (and the inventories of turret bodies, guns, gunsights etc held at the Wegmann plant) were controlled by an In-6 office and stored in separate locations under In-6 supervision, being provided at no cost, (ie.”free issue” ) to the two assembly plants.

  • The In-6 inventory control office at the assembly plants, controlled only the army purchased inventory. It required the Henschel ( and Wegmann) production foremen to submit requisitions for the army purchased raw materials they needed to assemble the tanks. Only In-6 personnel were allowed access to the In-6 records, receiving yards and storage areas, which were strictly ‘out of bounds’ to Henschel and Wegmann employees. (CIOS Report, ” Inspection Methods and Procedures on German AFV Manufacture, 1945,various pages)
  • Both Henschel and Wegmann sub-contracted for other specific parts and components needed for tank production from various manufacturers. The two assembly firms would have maintained their own receiving yards, inventory control office, warehouse office and storage facilities, separate from those of the In-6 controlled stores,

Though there is no specific data on the issuing of chassis number at Henschel, it is apparent from photographs and published Tiger II and Tiger 1 data,  that chassis numbers could NOT have been assigned at the end of the production line to the completed tanks, but were being assigned to hulls at Takt 1, at the start of production. Since the hulls were purchased by the army and remained under army In-6 control, Winniger’s comments that that the “Army Ordnance Office” controlled and supplied the chassis numbers, is correct. Though he is non-specific, it is logical to conclude the chassis numbers for Tiger 1 hulls were issued by the In-6 office, in blocks of chassis numbers, matched to the numbers of hulls specified on the Henschel foremen’s supply requisitions.

The welders stationed at each Takt 1 work station, apparently checked and repaired any defective welds found on the hulls,  The hulls were then cleaned and under-painted. When dry, the hulls were moved to the assembly area ahead of the Takt 2 machining site.. Based on photographs, the chassis numbers (and Werk numbers) were then assigned to each hull, probably by the Takt supervisor, with the appropriate numbers being painted or stenciled on the hull’s front, rear and sides, prior to beginning the machining process on the Takt 2.machining lines.

.4) Modifications such as the ‘Fuchs device” the 20 ton jack, the 600 mm idler wheels and the modified guide for the engine hand crank, can be found in photographs of several Tiger 1 tanks documented as having been completed between the last week of December 1943 and the first week of January 1944. The ‘Fuch’s Device and the new 20 ton jack were first recorded in the manuals etc at different times between mid January and February, 1944–about four weeks after their earlier appearance in late December..

(No specific data exists for the introduction of the  600mm idler wheels, the modified guide for the engine hand crank or the modified hinge for the turret escape hatch– other than the comment that the 600 mm idler wheels were introduced in February 1944. Again this is roughly four weeks after their earlier appearance.)

Details on the introduction of the close-in defence  (C I D) weapon on the German Panther and Tiger tanks are somewhat muddled and nebulous in the available publications. Consider the following points:

  • The Krupp designed MP port plug (MP-Stopfen) replaced the MP-Klappe in production at the Krupp steel rolling mills in May 1943 and later appeared on all tanks at the end of July 1943 ( three months later).
  • At some point in May or June, 1943 a new close-in defense weapon (Nahvertidigungswaffe) was tested and accepted for use on the Tiger 1, Panther, PzKwIV and other tanks.

Changes to be made to the Tiger 1 and Panther Ausf ‘A’ turrets were apparently ordered immediately into production at the rolling mills.

  • The MP-port plugs on both Panther and Tiger tank turrets were deleted at the rolling mills in September 1943 with welding assembly and shipments to the assembly plants beginning in late September-October.
  • The last shipments of Tiger tank turrets with the MP port plug were shipped to Wegmann, beginning at the start of October, 1943, and were intended to be depleted (used up) during assembly in December 1943
  • With the new changes, all new turrets completed at the rolling mills near the end of October, lacked the MP-port plug holes. However, the turret roof on all new turrets were now modified by having holes cut out for the installation of the close-in defense weapon
  • All shipments of Tiger turrets to Wegmann after late October now consisted ONLY of the revised turrets having the cut-out holes for installation of the close-in defense weapon.

(Note: The MP-plugs would not have been deleted at the rolling mills without having the openings for the CID weapon cut-out in the turret roof   The decision to eliminate the MP-plug was made in anticipation of the CID weapon being available in quantity during mid December 1943 and January,1944.)

However, according to Mr. Jentz in his book “DW to Tiger1,” (p.82,) the CID weapon was first “mounted in the roof at the left rear at the same time as the 40mm roof, starting in March 1944”.  If this was a fact, what about all those tanks completed in late December, January, or February 1944, which were assembled with the new turrets having roofs modified for the installation of the close-in defense weapon ?

The answer to this question appears to be found in Mr. Jentz’s earlier book, “Germany’s Panther Tank” ( p.75)  He notes, “due to shortages, the Nahvertidigungswaffe was first mounted on Panthers starting in March 1944. Many Ausf. A assembled in February and March had a circular plate held by four bolts to cover the hole in the roof for the missing Nahvertidigungswaffe” (A photograph on page 75 shows this plate installed on a Panther Ausf A turret roof)

Since there were shortages of the CID weapon, some CID weapons must have been available between January and March 1944, albeit  in short supply. If so, some Panther Ausf A turrets assembled in January or February 1944 must have been assembled with whatever CID weapon were available at the time, while others of necessity, were assembled with the circular plate, whenever the CID device was unavailable.

Similarly, the MP-plug had been eliminated on Tiger 1 turrets at the rolling mills in September, 1943,for October shipments to the Wegmann plant. Shipments of the new, modified Tiger 1 turrets containing the holes for the CID weapon, were sent to Wegmann, beginning in late October. Since some Tiger tanks are known to have been assembled with the new modified turrets, (ie. lacking the MP port plug) in late December 1943, production of these turrets at the Wegmann assembly plant must have begun at least twenty days earlier. (It is estimated Wegmann began the assembly of turrets approximately twenty days in advance of the scheduled completion date for a specific Tiger tank)..

Small numbers of the CID weapon must have been available at Wegmann, (albeit in smaller quantities than planned,) during mid December 1943 for the following reasons:

  • Tiger tanks were simply too valuable to be sent into action without having any means to defend the tank against enemy infantry tank-killer teams.The CID weapon was intended to replace the MP-plug for just that purpose.
  • Considering the high priority given by Hitler to both the CID weapon and Tiger 1 production, any available CID weapons would undoubtedly have been installed as a priority on the modified Tiger tank turrets, beginning in mid December, during the first production ‘run’ of the new Tiger 1 turrets, at the Wegmann plant. These turrets with the CID weapon installed, were shipped to Henschel for final assembly on a small number of the new, modified hulls, beginning in late December 1943

Due to the bombing of Kassel, the majority of turrets used in December and January, 1944 production, were older turrets still having the MP-plug. As a result, the CID weapon was not needed for assembly on most December and January production Tiger 1 tanks.

  • It is highly probable that some (but not all) of the new turrets assembled by Wegmann, during February 1944, had the temporary circular plates bolted over the openings for the CID weapon in the turret roof.
  • Since the CID weapon was not appearing on all turrets in full production, during late December, January or February, it was not listed in the manuals, etc.
  • Not until sufficient numbers of the CID weapon were finally received in mid March to meet all production needs, did the CID weapon appear “on all tanks leaving the assembly plant”, The D-Vorschriften, the AHM, the H.T.V.Bl. and other publications now recorded the CID weapon as appearing on all new tanks, beginning with chassis number 250991 in mid March 1944.
  • The CID weapon being recorded in the manuals etc, at the same time as the appearance of the 40mm roof in full production (on chassis no.250991) during March 1944, must have been a convenient coincidence. The turrets with the 40mm roofs would have been shipped to the Wegmann plant, beginning in late December–early January 1944 for mid March production schedules.

It is very probable any circular cover plates assembled on any Tiger tanks during February-early March 1944, would have been retro-fitted with the CID weapons by the workshops of the Heavy Tank battalion as a priority, once the CID weapons were available in quantity –after March 1944.



  1. A) T. Jentz & H. Doyle, “DW to Tiger 1’

-“VK.45.02 to Tiger II

– ‘Germany’s Tiger Tanks, Tiger 1 & II Combat Tactics

-“Tiger 1 Heavy Tank, 1942-1945 ( Osprey Publ)

– “Germany’s Panther tank” etc (

– “Panzer Tracts No 23, Panzer Production“ etc

– “Panzer Tracts” Nos 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 on the Panther tanks.

– “Panzer Tracts” no 16.1 on the Bergepanther, Ausf D,A,G

– “Panzer Tracts” Nos 3.2 and 3.3 on the Panzer III tank


  1. B) W. Spielberger, “Tiger & King Tiger Tank and their variants”

: -“The Panther Tank and it’s Variants

– “Panzers 35(t) and 38(t) and their variants 1920-1945““


  1. C) R. Mcdougal & D.Neeley, “Nuremberg’s Panzer Factory” 2013


  1. D) M. Winniger, “OKH Toy Factory – Niebelungenwerke”2013 (probably the best

book overall, on German tank production)


  1. E) M& G Green “Panther, Germany’s quest for combat dominance” (Osprey) 2012,


  1. E) E..Klein & V. Kuehn: “Tiger..The history of a legendary weapon” 1989.


  1. F) B. Culver & U. Feist “ Tiger and Sturmtiger in detail” 1994


  1. G) P. Mueller & W. Zimmermann “Sturmgeschuetz III etc” Vol 1, 2009


  1. H) N. Gregor, “ Daimler Benz in the Third Reich” 1998.


I ) The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Reports, 1947 (USSBS) Various,

-“Summary Report (European War)”

-Physical Damage Division “Henschel & Sohn GmbH, Kassel etc. , :

-Munitions Division, “Henschel & Sohn, Kassel Germany”

-Motor Vehicle and Tank Plant:Survey: “Henschel & Sohn, GmbH, Kassel”,

-“German Tank Industry Report, 2nd. Edition. 1947

-“German Motor Vehicles Industry Report” 1947

-Czech Tank Production Report, 1947

-Ordnance Industry Report: German Ordnance Industry Report, 1947


  1. J) Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub Committee: “(CIOS) Reports:

– “Inspection Methods and Procedures on German AFV Manufacture” 1945,

– “German Practice on Suspension and Running Gear for Tanks” 1945


  1. K) British Intelligence Objectives Sub-committee (BIOS) Reports::

-“Welding Design and Fabrication of German Tank Hulls and Turrets”,1946


  1. L) Tiger 1 Information Centre (on line) “The Henschel Tiger Factory,”


  1. M) Bitoh: “Achtung Panzer No.6, Panzerkampfwagen Tiger” No Date.

Assistance requested

 1) If anyone has a copy of the USSBS Interrogation Reports for interviews with Mr. Robert Pertus, the tank production Manager at Henschel, I would appreciate receiving a copy. Also, I need a full copy of Pertus’s reminiscences, which were published, in part, in Mr. Bruce Culver’s book, “Tiger and Sturmtiger in Detail” This data is sorely needed.

2) A source is needed for obtaining copies of the wartime air photographs of the Henschel and Wegmann assembly plants in Kassel during 1943-44.            ..







































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