Nicholas “The Chieftain” Moran has posted the fifth part of his series of articles on the history of US tank development during WW2. In the is post he compares and contrasts the difference in opinions between Army Ground Forces and Ordnance regarding tank development.
Now that that salvo is over, let’s have a gander at the whole lot, and compare/contrast with Ordnance’s view of things.
It is interesting to compare the line just above, “The agency controlling the using arm should likewise control the actual development program”, with the position of General Barnes over at Ordnance: “For these reasons, it is necessary for the Ordnance Department to take a strong lead over the using services in the development of new equipment and then to get the help of those using services in determining where the weapon best fits into battlefield operations.”
Put simply, they are mutually exclusive propositions. In effect, you have the scientists saying “If we just let the using arms come up with the equipment needs, nothing ‘new’ or revolutionary would ever be developed”, and you have the using arms saying “Stop focusing on hypothetical wonderweapons, and put all your energy into this thing we know we need right now.”