Today we present an original article written by Matt Dedrick titled “Reading Between the Lines: Estimating Tiger Tank Production.” Mr. Dedrick has spent a good deal of time wrestling with the topic of Tiger tank production during WW2, particularly the effects on Tiger 1 production caused by the strategic bombing of Kassel on October 22,23, 1943.
This is the first of a series of articles intended to explore the effects on Tiger 1 production caused by the Royal Air Forces’s area fire-bombing of the medieval City of Kassel on the night of October 22,23, 1943. Though the bombing of Kassel was regarded by Henschel management and the Heereswaffenamt to have been the singular event most affecting Tiger 1 production, it has been virtually ignored in the available literature As a result, the production of Tiger 1 tanks during the four months following the bombing of Kassel has been poorly understood by modellers and tank historians alike.
Most of the data and documents on Tiger 1 production was lost during the war. Much of what is available has been researched, interpreted and published in the many books compiled by those two remarkable research-historians, the late Mr. Tom Jentz and the late Mr. Walter Spielberger The data found in their books has been largely based on Henschel monthly production statistics, wartime documents, minutes from the Heereswaffenamt /Henschel meetings, post war interviews, photographs as well as the data found in the various army manuals, journals and publications.